‘The Special Service Squadron of the Royal Marines’: The Royal Navy and Organic Amphibious Warfare Capability before 1914 by Seligmann, M
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjss20
Journal of Strategic Studies
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20
‘The special service squadron of the Royal
Marines’: The Royal Navy and organic amphibious
warfare capability before 1914
Matthew S. Seligmann
To cite this article: Matthew S. Seligmann (2020): ‘The special service squadron of the Royal
Marines’: The Royal Navy and organic amphibious warfare capability before 1914, Journal of
Strategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1816972
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1816972
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 29 Sep 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 570
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
ARTICLE
‘The special service squadron of the Royal Marines’: 
The Royal Navy and organic amphibious warfare 
capability before 1914
Matthew S. Seligmann
Division of Politics and History, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Brunel University 
London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
It is usually maintained that before 1914 the Royal Navy had abandoned interest 
in amphibious warfare. This article argues otherwise. It shows that prior to 1914 
the Admiralty sought to reconfigure the Royal Marines as an organic maritime 
strike force. The idea was advanced by junior officers and taken up by the naval 
leadership, who appointed a high-level committee to elaborate the details. 
Significant steps had been taken before war broke out, thereby showing that 
modern British amphibious warfare doctrine pre-dates the ill-fated Gallipoli 
operation and needs to be understood in a broader context than is currently 
the case.
KEYWORDS Royal Marines; amphibious warfare; First World War; Royal Navy
Amphibious warfare has been a hotly contested topic in military and naval history: 
when did it start, who was involved, and where? Its origins and development are of 
more than just academic interest, as the syllabus of any military college will attest.1 
History informs current thinking on the subject in so many ways, and so much of this 
historical interest pivots on Britain and its actions before and during the Great War, 
most especially the ill-fated seaborne assault on Gallipoli in 1915. This article sub-
stantially extends our understanding of this topic by re-evaluating the place of 
amphibious warfare in pre-1914 British naval planning. Existing works universally 
depict the British military leadership as having abandoned all interest in combined 
operations early in the first decade of the twentieth century, with the Navy following 
suit in late 1911. In direct contrast to this interpretation, it will be argued here that, far 
from abandoning amphibious warfare, the Admiralty actually developed 
a heightened belief in its value in the two years prior to the outbreak of the First 
World War. Indeed, so deep was this conviction that Britain’s naval leaders, aware of 
CONTACT Matthew S. Seligmann Matthew.Seligmann@Brunel.ac.uk Brunel Brunel University 
London, Kingston Lane, Uxbridge, UB8 3PH, UK
1Jeremy Black, Combined Operations: A Global History of Amphibious and Airborne Warfare (Lanham MD: 
Roman & Littlefield 2017).
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the General Staff’s deep hostility to any involvement in such campaigns, actually 
sought to create their own organic ship-to-shore capability so as to be able to 
undertake amphibious landings without the Army’s cooperation.
I
The historiography on the development of amphibious warfare in Britain before 
1914 is clear. It is generally accepted that in the run up to the First World War the 
leadership of the British Army, which had once strongly promoted combined 
operations, shifted this littoral emphasis towards continental style coalition war-
fare. While enthusiasts for combined operations still existed – Major-General 
Charles Callwell being a good example2 – in the early years of the twentieth 
century, under the aegis of such advocates of the ‘continental commitment’ as 
Generals James Grierson, Spencer Ewart and Henry Wilson, the army re-modelled 
itself as an expeditionary force ready to fight traditional land battles in north- 
western Europe.3 Any proposals that might detract from this plan – such as 
earmarking assets for coastal landings – were from then on deprecated. Given 
the scholarly consensus surrounding this analysis, the focus of the debate on the 
development of British amphibious warfare has been on the extent to which the 
Royal Navy planned to use such methods in the event of war with Germany. On 
this subject there is considerable division. Particularly controversial is the question 
of how far, if at all, landings from the sea informed the strategic thinking of the First 
Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher. The 
orthodox historiography, epitomised by the works of Arthur Marder, maintains 
that combined operations related to the seizure of North Sea islands or landings 
on the Baltic coast were a major component in Fisher’s pre-war planning.4 
Whether these projects were seen as an admirable extension of Britain’s historical 
maritime traditions or unrealistic fantasies based upon a complete disregard for 
the technological innovations of modern warfare has evoked some dispute, but 
that the plans existed and were genuine reflections of Admiralty thinking was not 
initially called into question.5 That changed when Nicholas Lambert published 
a revisionist study of British war planning. Contrary to the orthodox view, he 
2Daniel Whittingham, Charles E. Callwell and the British Way in Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2020).
3Keith Jeffrey, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford: Oxford UP 2006); John Gooch, The 
Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c.1900–1916 (London: Routledge 1974); 
Samuel Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard UP 1969).
4Arthur J. Marder, F[rom the] D[readnought to] S[capa] F[low: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–19] 
Vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford UP 1961–70) I, 383–8; P. Haggie, ‘The Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher 
Era’, in Paul Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914 (London: Allen and Unwin 
1979).
5Nicolas d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain, 1902–14 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1996); Paul Hayes, ‘Britain, Germany, and the Admiralty’s Plans for 
Attacking German Territory, 1906–15ʹ in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes, Robert O’Neill (eds.), War, 
Strategy and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford: Oxford UP 1992), 
95–116.
2 M. S. SELIGMANN
argued that Fisher never seriously advocated in-shore combined operations.6 In 
his view, Admiralty proposals for seaborne landings were merely smoke screens 
aimed at disrupting the military’s continental strategy and moving the war plan-
ning agenda towards a more maritime approach. Indeed, Lambert argues that the 
Admiralty’s real plan was an extreme form of economic warfare designed to 
exploit the vulnerabilities of the German financial system by bringing down the 
global economy within months of a war starting, a method of attack that he has on 
at least one occasion labelled as ‘Brits-Krieg’.7 This argument has proved 
controversial.8 All its elements have been subjected to critical re-appraisal, includ-
ing the claim that amphibious warfare was never a genuine element in Jacky 
Fisher’s war plans. In a detailed examination of Fisher’s strategic thinking, Shawn 
Grimes has shown that capturing an island near the German North Sea coast in 
order to acquire an advance base for in-shore blockade operations was central to 
Fisher’s strategic thinking. Thus, far from being a mere smoke screen, combined 
operations were an essential element in British naval war planning.9 Grimes’ 
analysis, although probably the dominant view today, is not shared by revisionist, 
thus demonstrating the current historiographical divide.10
Nevertheless, if the role of amphibious warfare in the period from 1904 to 
1910 is much debated, there is a broad consensus over what happened 
thereafter. According to just about all accounts, Fisher’s successor as First 
Sea Lord, Sir Arthur Wilson, developed his own plans for seizing German 
North Sea islands as a means of facilitating a blockade of Germany’s main 
naval ports. On 23 August 1911, these proposals were put before government 
ministers at a special meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, where 
they met with considerable scepticism. Indeed, Wilson’s performance per-
suaded the assembled decision-makers that naval planning should not be the 
job of just one figure, however senior and eminent, and that a naval staff was 
needed for this purpose.11 Wilson, who opposed the creation of such a body, 
was duly dismissed and with him, or so it is said, went his plans for amphi-
bious operations. Admittedly Churchill, the new First Lord of the Admiralty, 
later sought to re-introduce schemes for offensive ship-to-shore campaigns 
against German islands and appointed a committee under Rear-Admiral 
6Nicholas A. Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare in the First World War (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard UP 2012).
7Nicholas A. Lambert, ‘Brits-Krieg: The Strategy of Economic Warfare’, in George Perkovich and Ariel 
Levite (eds.), Understanding Cyber Conflict: 14 Analogies (Georgetown: Georgetown UP 2017), 123–46.
8John Coogan, ‘The Short-War Illusion Resurrected: The Myth of Economic Warfare as the British 
Schlieffen Plan’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38 (2015), 1045–64; John R. Ferris, ‘To the Hunger 
Blockade: The Evolution of British Economic Warfare, 1914–1915ʹ, in Michael Epkenhans and 
Stephan Huck (eds.), Der Erste Weltkrieg zur See (Oldenbourg De Gruyter 2017), 84.
9Shawn Grimes, ‘Combined Operations and British Strategy, 1900–9ʹ, Historical Research 89 (2016), 
866–84.
10Matthew S. Seligmann, ‘The Renaissance of Pre-First World War Naval History’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 36 (2013), 454–479.
11Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy, 191–3; David Morgan-Owen, The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, 
Politics and British War Planning, 1880–1914 (Oxford: Oxford UP 2017), 201–2.
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Lewis Bayly to draw up blueprints.12 However, Bayly’s work was not well 
received in the Admiralty and nothing had come of his work by the time that 
the First World War began.13 On top of that, this apparent last-minute 
resurgence in interest has been largely written off as the eccentric idea of 
Churchill, the amateur strategist. For most historians it did not represent the 
broad consensus within the service about amphibious warfare.14 In effect, 
therefore, the consensus is that seaborne landings had ceased to be a serious 
element in British naval planning by the end of 1911, at least until their most 
unfortunate revival at Gallipoli in 1915.
This paper while accepting the new orthodoxy as established by Grimes 
regarding the importance of amphibious warfare to the Admiralty in the 
period from 1904 to 1910, does so with one significant change in emphasis. 
While Grimes mostly focused on the role of combined operations in British 
naval thinking – that is to say undertakings in which the Navy provided the 
sea transport, the escorting warships and the covering fire, while the Army 
contributed the military manpower – this paper will instead stress the Navy’s 
desire to develop its own organic amphibious capability, one that, if realised, 
would have made the senior service independent of Army cooperation and 
capable of conducing landing operations from its own resources. The only 
way in which such an objective could have been achieved at this time was by 
repurposing significant parts of the Royal Marines into a dedicated seaborne 
strike force. What made the Marines the most obvious candidate for this role 
was that they were not an independent uniformed service. As an existing 
fighting arm of the Royal Navy under the direct control of the Admiralty, no 
negotiations with another branch of government would be needed to effect 
this change. Furthermore, their status as soldiers with maritime experience 
meant that they were already acculturated to ship-to-sore operations. On top 
of this, their existing force structure, consisting of two elements, the Royal 
Marines Light Infantry (‘the Red Marines’) and the Royal Marine Artillery (‘the 
Blue Marines’), meant that they could provide both troops and inbuilt fire-
power. As such, they were already the most obvious source of personnel for 
shore detachments and landing parties. Upscaling them for wider and more 
intensive amphibious warfare was not, therefore, an unimaginable leap and 
was potentially more useful than their existing role of ensuring discipline at 
sea, providing bandsmen, and manning a turret in larger warships. On the 
contrary, suggestions for just such a reorganisation had already been made 
on several occasions in the first decade of the twentieth century, a fact that 
has been noted, albeit fleetingly, by a few historians. However, probably 
because nothing seemingly came of these initiatives, they have not generally 
12Christopher M. Bell, Churchill and Sea Power (Oxford: Oxford UP 2013), 48.
13David Morgan-Owen, ‘Cooked up in the Dinner Hour? Sir Arthur Wilson’s War Plans Reconsidered’, 
English Historical Review 545 (2015), 891–3.
14Hayes, ‘Britain, Germany, and the Admiralty’s Plans’.
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been accorded any importance in the historiography.15 Instead, where their 
existence has attracted any comment at all, it has generally been to stress that 
these proposals were outside the mainstream of naval thinking, put forward 
by officers intellectually ahead of their times and in no sense an indication of 
a major strand in contemporary naval thought and certainly not one likely to 
attract the attention of the Admiralty.16 This article will argue otherwise. In an 
interesting parallel with contemporaneous efforts in the United States to 
create an advance base force of the Marine Corps, it will show that not only 
were the early papers on a Royal Marine striking force genuinely meant and 
seriously considered, but, of even greater importance, they left an important 
legacy.17 This became evident after the extraordinary meeting of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) on 23 August 1911. While the session 
undoubtedly set in motion the early retirement of Sir Arthur Wilson and the 
subsequent abandonment of key elements of his war plans – most notably 
those aspects involving the close blockade of the German North Sea coast – 
the rejection of amphibious operations by the naval leadership was definitely 
not one of the outcomes. On the contrary, following the August CID meeting 
there developed a new impetus behind the idea of re-purposing the Marines 
as a strike force and this led to a serious officially sanctioned investigation 
into the possibility of providing the Navy with the ability to undertake landing 
operations without the involvement of the Army, whose cooperation it was 
now abundantly evident would not be forthcoming. These efforts, which will 
be outlined in detail in this article, provide clear proof that coastal landing 
was not just a feature of the Fisher era, but remained a major component of 
Admiralty thinking right up to the eve of the First World War. To begin with, 
however, it is necessary to outline the antecedents of the process that began 
after the August 1911 CID meeting by highlighting the early private efforts to 
promote amphibious warfare and to repurpose the Royal Marines for this role.
II
The officer who most clearly personifies the service’s early interest in developing 
its own organic amphibious warfare capability is Maurice Hankey. Hankey would 
have an illustrious career, becoming in 1912 the Secretary of the Committee of 
15David R. Massam, ‘British Maritime Strategy and Amphibious Capability 1900–1940ʹ, PhD, Oxford, 1995, 
245–7; Matthew Heaslip, ‘Britain’s Armed Forces and Amphibious Operations in Peace and War 
1919–1939: A Gallipoli Curse?’, Journal of Strategic Studies (on-line January 2019).
16For example, Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets Vol. 3 (London: Collins 1970–74) I, 66; Ian Speller, 
The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy, 1945–56 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001), 21.
17Jeter A. Isley and Philp A. Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory, and its Practice in the 
Pacific (Princeton: Princeton UP 1951), 21–4; Graham A. Cosmas and Jack Shulimson, ‘The Culebra 
Maneuver and the Formation of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Advance Base Force, 1913–1914ʹ, in Merrill 
L. Bartlett (ed.), Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press 1983); Leo J. Daugherty III, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945: Profiles of 
Fourteen American Military Strategists (Jefferson NC: McFarland 2009), 71–89.
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Imperial Defence and in 1916 the first and ultimately longest serving Cabinet 
Secretary. At the outset of the twentieth century, however, he was merely 
a captain in the Royal Marine Artillery. Hankey’s personal papers show that he 
started investigating what he labelled ‘warfare on the littoral’ while serving in the 
Mediterranean Fleet, possibly as early as 1899. Two aspects of the argument he 
developed in his very first appreciations are worth highlighting. The first is the 
view that history validated the idea that assault from the sea was invariably 
a feature in maritime war, if not at the outset of conflict when command of the 
sea was in contention, then certainly at the point that one side had achieved 
superiority over the other. Posing the semi-rhetorical question is there ‘any 
reasonable probability that in future wars the Navy will be called upon to under-
take operations upon the enemy’s coastline’, he responded that ‘naval wars 
almost always arrive sooner or later at a stage when one of the belligerents . . . 
is obliged to withdraw to the shelter of its defended ports’. At this point the other 
would be obliged ‘to establish a rigorous surveillance over the ports in which the 
enemy has taken refuge . . . ’ To achieve this, Hankey argued, would bring about 
the ‘necessity of an advanced base’, something demonstrated in previous wars 
such as the blockade of Toulon during the French Revolutionary Wars, which ‘led 
to the reduction of Corsica’, or, more recently, the Sino-Japanese and Spanish- 
American Wars, which led to ‘numerous minor operations on the coastline . . . 
such as the seizure and occupation of advanced bases for the fleet’. The second 
key line of argument was that the assets best suited to undertaking such actions 
were those personnel most familiar with maritime conditions, namely sailors put 
ashore as part of a Naval Brigade or the Royal Marines. As Hankey relayed, ‘there is 
an old saying that a boat will hold 100 sailors, 75 marines or 50 soldiers . . . ’ He 
continued that seamen and Marines would, by simple familiarity with the nautical 
domain, be better at embarking and disembarking than soldiers and would make 
the transition from boat to shore quicker and more easily than their military 
counterparts.18 The implication regarding their greater utility in these circum-
stances was clear.
Hankey’s initial jottings concerning ‘warfare on the littoral’ were intended 
to form the basis of a book on the subject. The book never materialised, but 
the effort was certainly not wasted as the ideas in the draft manuscript would 
subsequently be utilised as the basis of several formal submissions making 
the case for a dedicated naval amphibious capability.
The first of these comes from early 1904. In May of that year Hankey, by then 
attached to the coast defence section of the Naval Intelligence Department (NID), 
submitted a nine-page memorandum to the Head of the NID’s War Division, 
Captain George Alexander Ballard, on ‘Advance Bases for the Fleet’, in which he 
reiterated and elaborated the arguments he had made previously in ‘warfare on 
18Hankey, ‘Warfare on the Littoral’ n/d [but commenced according to notations on cover in 1899]. 
Cambridge, United Kingdom, C[hurchill] A[rchive] C[entre]: [Maurice Hankey Papers] HNKY 6/1.
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the littoral’.19 As before, using historical examples from previous conflicts – most 
notably the Sino-Japanese War and the Spanish-American War – he stressed that 
a blockading fleet would require proximate advance bases to operate off an 
enemy’s coast. However, he now fleshed out the force that would be needed to 
hold such a lodgement. Arguing that this should be made up exclusively of 
Marines on the grounds that there was no military unit ready for such a role and 
that Marines were better trained in recognizing friendly and hostile ships and so 
less likely to fire on the former by mistake, he listed in detail not just the supplies, 
but also the ordnance and personnel that should be prepared for this role. In 
compiling this roster, he drew heavily on reports of recent manoeuvres con-
ducted by the United States Marine Corps in Subic Bay in the Philippines, which 
highlighted the importance of light weight equipment in the rapid completion of 
the temporary defences.20 Finally, he also specified other operations beyond 
holding an advanced base for which such a force of Marines would be useful.
As Hankey later recalled, Ballard was extremely busy when this proposal was 
submitted, and he set it aside for later consideration. When that came, over 
a year later, Ballard was extremely impressed, but thought the paper would be 
more likely to receive a favourable hearing from the Admiralty if it emanated 
not from the Naval Intelligence Department, but directly from the Royal Marine 
authorities. Accordingly, Hankey sent it to the Assistant Adjutant General, 
Lieutenant-Colonel James Henry Bor, to ask if a revised version – one that 
was updated to include pertinent examples from the Russo-Japanese War – 
might be something that the Deputy Adjutant General (DAG) would be pre-
pared to include in a formal submission to the Board.21 Bor’s response was 
positive: ‘I have shown this to the DAG and he is quite willing to put the 
proposal forward for consideration. . . . As you have offered to revise it will 
you kindly do so at your convenience and return it to me.’22
While it does not appear as if Hankey ever took up this opportunity, he did 
continue to press his ideas in other fora. For example, in July 1905 he appeared 
as a witness before the Committee on the ‘Training of Junior Naval Officers 
under the New Scheme’ headed by Vice-Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas. Hankey 
used the opportunity provided by his personal testimony to push for amphi-
bious warfare to part of the curriculum. As he explained to the committee, an 
officer in the Royal Marines:
wants to be a specialist in littoral warfare – warfare of the coast. I have studied 
a good many wars lately with a view to trying to find out what he should know, 
19Hankey, ‘Advance Bases for the Fleet’, 2 May 1904. CAC: HNKY 6/3.
20Interestingly, recent studies have noted the institutional similarity between the Royal Marines and the 
US Marine Corps at the outset of the twentieth century. Heather P. Venable, How the Few became the 
Proud: Crafting the Marine Corps Mystique, 1874–1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 2019). The fact 
that both were thinking about advance base doctrine at the same time reinforces this.
21Hankey to Bor, 29 November 1905. CAC: HNKY 6/3.
22Marginal Note by Bor to Hankey, 2 January 1906. Ibid.
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and I have come to the conclusion that instead of being, as at present, taught 
mainly Military duties and Infantry Drill, he wants to study especially raids, . . . 
and the defence of advanced bases, such as the Japanese at Elliott [sic] 
Islands,23 or the American Marines at Guantanamo, where they defended the 
advanced base, kept off the Spanish skirmishers, and thus enabled the ships to 
coal in safety. Then, again, the seizure and preparation of landing-places for the 
subsequent advance of an army.24
He took a similar line when in December 1906 he crafted a paper entitled 
‘Proposals for improving the Constitution of our Military Striking Force’.25 It 
began with a warning that there was a gap in Britain’s defence preparations: 
‘the lack in our national war organisation of any body of troops, which can be 
despatched at a moment’s notice, and without attracting a large share of 
public attention for an enterprise across the sea, and which is trained to 
disembark rapidly upon a hostile shore.’26 This deficiency, Hankey main-
tained, was all the more telling as the Admiralty had recently examined 
a number of projects each and every one of which would have required 
landing an armed force from the sea. Top of his list was ‘seizing by a coup-de- 
main the German island of Borkum, as a flying base for submarines and 
destroyers’. Given this evident need and the ‘remarkable fact that . . . there 
exists no organised force . . . which is trained for rapid disembarkation on 
a hostile coast’, Hankey proceeded to consider how it might be provided. His 
answer was a simple one: ‘a portion of the Royal Marines should be organised 
so as to provide the first detachment of our national striking force.’ The 
Marines, he argued, were ‘by their organisation and training no less than by 
their traditions . . . peculiarly qualified to undertake this responsibility.’27
Hankey again took up this cause a mere two years later when, in conjunc-
tion with Fisher’s trusted assistant, Commander Thomas Evans Crease, he 
penned a paper on the ‘Organisation of an Expeditionary Force’.28 The 
rationale was the same as in the previous papers: ‘a small, fully equipped 
Military Expeditionary Force, capable of being launched at a few hours’ 
notice’ was needed for such purposes as taking ‘possession of an island, or 
a harbour on the enemy’s coast that is to be used as a temporary base for 
naval operations, and afterwards to provide the land defence of the base.’ 
23The Elliot Islands, now known as Changhai County, are an archipelago off the Liaodong Peninsula, close 
to Port Arthur.
24Parliamentary Papers, ‘Reports of Departmental Committees appointed to consider certain questions 
concerning the Extension of the New Scheme of Training for Officers of the Navy, &c.’, 1906, Cd.2841.
25Hankey, ‘Proposals for improving the Constitution of our Military Striking Force’, 12 December 1906. 
CAC: HNKY 6/4.
26That the time required for the British Army to mobilise would inevitably delay any amphibious 
operations dependent upon inter-service cooperation had been a point at issue since the mid- 
1890s. David Morgan-Owen, ‘War as it Might have been: British Sea Power and the First World War’, 
Journal of Military History 83 (2019), 1110.
27Hankey, ‘Proposals’.
28Crease and Hankey, ‘Organisation of an Expeditionary Force’, October 1908. T[he] N[ational] A[rchives 
of the United Kingdom]: CAB[inet papers] 63/1.
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Such a force, it was re-iterated, could not be composed of army units. 
Deploying regular soldiers would not only be time-consuming, as most 
barracks were far from the coast, but would also excite a lot of attention 
and so compromise the element of surprise. Accordingly, it was insisted that 
‘the whole force should be drawn from the Royal Marines.’ Having once 
established this, the remainder of the 28 page memorandum outlined how 
4565 officers and men of the Royal Marines – the number considered neces-
sary for the operations proposed – could be assembled and how the food, 
stores, ammunition, hospital and transport arrangements for such a force 
could be put together.
This was not Hankey’s last paper on the subject. According to his later 
recollection, he delivered a ‘rough sketch’ version of the 1908 memorandum 
to Winston Churchill, the New First Lord of the Admiralty, in 1912.29 As far as it 
is possible to tell from the surviving record, this, his sixth analysis of the topic, 
was Hankey’s final attempt to promote the idea of the Royal Navy developing 
its own organic amphibious capability by re-organizing the Royal Marines 
into a dedicated strike force. It is, however, worth noting that, if Hankey was 
the most persistent advocate of this project, he was not entirely alone. In 
September 1906, for example, Richard Phillimore, the Flag Captain to Admiral 
Douglas, the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, also submitted a paper on 
the need for a dedicated British ‘striking force’ capable of being landed on the 
enemy’s coast. Like Hankey, he, also, saw the Royal Marines as central to such 
a project.30
III
As can be seen, decidedly in the person of Maurice Hankey, a tenacious 
advocate of this idea, and to a lesser extent in the form of other more 
occasional contributors, such as Thomas Crease and Richard Phillimore, the 
Royal Navy possessed a body of opinion that saw a need for an organic ship- 
to-shore landing capability that was not dependent upon the cooperation 
and involvement of the Army. The significance of this has so far been missed. 
In the existing historiography, it is generally perceived as largely ineffectual 
and irrelevant to the development of naval policy, with no officially sanc-
tioned initiatives stemming from its efforts. The reality is somewhat different 
and, ironically, it seems that the event that is normally regarded as the death 
29Hankey to Dixon, 12 November 1914. Ibid. A further document in the Hankey collection, ‘A suggested 
improvement in the composition of the military forces of Great Britain’ is dated by one historian as 
‘after 1912ʹ [HNKY 7/1], which might qualify it as the paper in question. Jim Beach, ‘The British Army, 
the Royal Navy, and the ‘Big Work’ of Sir George Aston, 1904–1914ʹ, Journal of Strategic Studies 29 
(2006), 162.
30Phillimore, ‘Further Employment of the Royal Marines’, enclosed in Phillimore to Douglas, 8 September 1906. 
TNA: ADM[iralty papers] 116/996.
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knell of serious Admiralty interest in amphibious warfare was the spark for its 
re-ignition.
On 23 August 1911, at a specially convened meeting of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, the War Office and the Admiralty outlined their plans for 
war with Germany.31 Sir Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord, explained that the 
Navy intended to mount a close blockade of the German coast and to 
facilitate this called for the seizure by amphibious landings mounted by 
regular soldiers of the islands of Wangeroog in the North Sea and Fehmarn 
in the Baltic. Wilson also named Heligoland in the German Bight as another 
potential target for seaborne assault. It was, of course, blockade rather than 
combined operations that lay at the heart of Wilson’s plans, a fact recognised 
on the day by Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, and subsequently 
rediscovered by the historian David Morgan-Owen.32 This has not, however, 
stopped commentators then and since characterizing Wilson’s desire to 
capture an island base as ‘madness’ and using these proposed operations 
as a reason to question his grasp of the realities of modern warfare. The 
soldiers present at the meeting were unsurprisingly hostile – Sir William 
Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, described the plans as 
‘doomed to failure’ – but their condemnation was matched by that of the 
politicians, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith labelling them as ‘puerile’ and 
Home Secretary Winston Churchill retorting that he was filled with consider-
able ‘misgiving’ at what Sir Arthur had proposed.33
It is notable, however, that none of these criticisms dulled Sir Arthur Wilson’s 
enthusiasm for his amphibious ideas. Indeed, less than a week after the CID 
meeting the Admiralty wrote to the War Office with a formal request that 
a force of 6000 infantry plus supporting units be kept in readiness to assist 
the Navy in its North Sea operations. Predictably given their earlier attitude, the 
General Staff was unimpressed. Claiming that the proposals ‘could only end in 
disaster,’ they refused outright. Noting that ‘assistance from the Army would be 
worse than useless if not cordially given’, Wilson then drew a line under this 
issue, an action that for most historians marked the end of serious pre-First 
World War plans for combined operations.34 Wilson’s dismissal three months 
later has further reinforced the sense that a new era in naval planning was 
beginning, one in which combined operations would play no part.
In one respect this was undeniably correct: the General Staff’s refusal to 
cooperate with the Admiralty’s schemes did, inevitably, close any prospect of 
meaningful combined operations.35 However, it is important at this juncture 
31Committee of Imperial Defence, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting, August 23, 1911ʹ. TNA: CAB 2/2.
32Morgan-Owen, ‘Cooked up’, 865–906.
33Ibid.
34Minute by Wilson, 9 September 1911. Marder, FDSF, I, 394.
35In 1913 a revised ‘Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations would be issued.’ Its existence is 
no indication of interest at that time in either service in such activities. TNA: W[ar]O[ffice papers] 33/ 
644.
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to differentiate between combined operations, which by definition necessi-
tated the involvement of the Army, and amphibious projects, which, while 
certainly needing military force, did not require that force to be provided by 
the War Office. If the Navy could supply its own assets, then it could continue 
to entertain proposals for coastal campaigns irrespective of the views of the 
General Staff. Of course, in late 1911, the Admiralty possessed no such 
capability, the regular use of small naval brigades in nineteenth century 
warfare notwithstanding, and, consequently, this was not a viable option. 
Yet, as we have seen, there was a long tradition of far-sighted officers such as 
Hankey suggesting the creation of just such a force. All that was therefore 
required was for someone with influence to revive this tradition and for the 
Admiralty to take it seriously. That was exactly what was to take place.
In the first half of 1912, a matter of months after Sir Arthur Wilson had been 
dismissed and his war plans, with their schemes for capturing German islands, 
had been abandoned, the new Second Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, 
formally submitted a minute calling for the establishment of what he termed 
a ‘Flying Corps of the Royal Marines.’36 This proposal had nothing to do with 
aviation. Rather, as Battenberg explained, his intention was ‘to form such 
a Corps which could be utilised for seizing an advanced base for the Fleet, 
either in British, Neutral or Hostile Territory.’ To this end, he sketched out in brief 
its possible composition. If 800 enlisted men from the Royal Marine Light 
Infantry were taken from each of the naval bases at Chatham, Portsmouth 
and Plymouth and combined with 600 members of the Royal Marine Artillery 
from Eastney and if this concentration of manpower were supplemented by 
a number of 4.7 inch guns on moveable mountings, along with some 12 
pounder guns on field carriages and some 24 inch searchlights, then 
a dedicated force of 3000 officers and men with specialised equipment would 
be brought into being. Battenberg further proposed, although this was not an 
essential element of the scheme, that a portion of this force be made up of 
active service personnel with the remainder coming from the reserves on 
mobilisation. He ended his minute: ‘If approved, the Chief of Staff and Deputy 
Adjutant General might be directed to elaborate the details forthwith.’37
The new First Sea Lord, Sir Francis Bridgeman, was enthusiastic. Passing on 
Battenberg’s minute, which he described as ‘a valuable suggestion’, to the Chief 
36Battenberg, ‘Flying Corps of the Royal Marines’, 5 June 1912, in Admiralty Case 11193. TNA: ADM 116/ 
1293. There is some confusion over the dating of this document. Battenberg’s original manuscript is 
dated ‘5/6/12ʹ, but Bridgeman’s minute in response is dated ‘6.5.12ʹ. One of these is clearly wrong. In 
the Admiralty papers the mistake is attributed to Bridgeman, the date of whose minute is corrected by 
an unknown hand to 5 June. However, there is also a typescript version of the correspondence in 
a Royal Marines Office docket (TNA: ADM 1/8313). In this version, it is Battenberg’s dating that is 
queried, and a correction is applied giving the day of completion of his paper as 6 May 1912. As 
subsequent references in the papers are made to Battenberg’s ‘minute of 5 June’, this article will 
assume that this is the correct dating.
37Ibid. The existence of these minutes has been obscured either by their being mislabelled or by their 
being filed with papers on other subjects.
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of Staff, Rear-Admiral Ernest Troubridge, he called for comment. ‘Please criti-
cise – favourably if possible – as it’s a really useful idea.’38 If this implied that the 
First Sea Lord expected Troubridge to be ill-disposed to Battenberg’s ideas, he 
need not have worried. ‘The establishment of such a force as that proposed by 
the Second Sea Lord,’ began the Chief of Staff, ‘would fill a long-felt gap in the 
Naval and Military organisation of the Empire and would add greatly to the 
offensive power of the Navy.’ Citing a 1910 Committee of Imperial Defence 
paper on the ‘Principles of Imperial Defence’, he went on to suggest that such 
a force would be particularly useful for capturing an advanced base for the 
fleet.39 Previously, he noted, such an undertaking would generally have neces-
sitated assistance from the Army ‘with the inherent disadvantages of dual 
control and the putting in force of their comparatively cumbrous and slow 
mobilisation system (with its consequent publicity) before the expedition can 
start.’ However, Battenberg’s idea would ‘do away with all these disadvantages, 
and the Admiralty would always have at a few hours’ call the services of 
a compact, highly trained, and mobile force to employ whenever required.’ 
Nevertheless, if Troubridge was supportive, he still had two suggestions: first, 
that to avoid confusion with the Royal Flying Corps, the new body be called the 
‘Special Service Force, Royal Marines’; second, that, given the ‘difficult and 
arduous nature of the duties’ which this force was intended to perform and 
the fact that mounting an opposed landing was ‘amongst the most difficult 
operations of war’, the leadership and training of the proposed unit would need 
to be strengthened. In particular, the ‘cadres of these battalions should be in 
existence during peace, and the officers and men on the active list should be 
appointed for a certain fixed period’, as should the commander of the force, the 
battalion commanders and their adjutants. In addition, the necessary outfit of 
light artillery and searchlights should be assembled and permanently retained 
at Eastney ‘for immediate use.’ Troubridge then concluded with a re-iteration of 
his strong support:
The expense involved by the establishment of a force so organised would be 
comparatively small, and the increase in offensive power of the Fleet in having 
ready at hand at a few hours’ notice a well-trained and organised force for use 
anywhere in seizing an advanced naval base, would be very great.40
Did anything come of this? At the time that Battenberg made this suggestion 
the naval leadership was grappling with the important question of whether to 
turn Scapa Flow, a large natural harbour in the Orkney Islands, into a wartime 
base for the fleet. Given that there were many channels into Scapa Flow, were it 
37Ibid. The existence of these minutes has been obscured either by their being mislabelled or by their 
being filed with papers on other subjects.
38Minute by Bridgeman, 5 June 1912 [6.5.12 in original]. Ibid.
39Committee of Imperial Defence, ‘Principles of Imperial Defence’, Paper 62c, 8 July 1910. TNA: CAB 5/2.
40Memorandum by Troubridge, 10 June 1912 [10/5/12 in typescript]. TNA: ADM 1/8313.
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to be designated as a naval anchorage, these would need to be secured either 
by being blocked by heavy obstructions or through being fortified by artillery. 
As a rule, this would require the government to embark upon the expensive 
process of erecting fixed defences and establishing a permanent garrison. 
However, with the naval estimates already at an all-time high, a cheaper alter-
native was being considered. This was to restrict the fixed gun and search light 
emplacements to the widest and most easily accessible entrances into the bay 
and to set aside some portable weapons and equipment that could be rushed 
to the narrower and more difficult ones in the event of conflict. To test out the 
viability of this proposal, it had been decided back in May to despatch 
a squadron of Royal Marines equipped with field guns and moveable search-
lights to Flotta Island in the Bay during the summer manoeuvres to determine 
how quickly and effectively they could render the channels impregnable.41 
Battenberg saw in this operation an opportunity simultaneously to appraise his 
own proposal as the force to ‘be used in the coming manoeuvres to seize and 
hold Scappa [sic] Flow anchorage’, although smaller than the one he envisaged 
for his ‘flying squadron’, was not dissimilar in role and mobility.42 Thus, a test of 
one would also be a test of the other. However, while this made perfect sense 
and was for that reason accepted by the Board, it had two unfortunate 
consequences. First, by assessing the viability of a strike force through the 
medium of an operation designed to afford protection to a British territorial 
base, it inextricably intertwined two different roles – home defence and over-
seas operations – and so muddled the purpose of the new force. The unin-
tended danger was thereby inadvertently created that future progress over the 
flying column would become bound up with the question of the defence 
arrangements for Scapa Flow. Second, as these manoeuvres were scheduled 
to commence in July this meant that, despite Bridgeman’s support and 
Troubridge’s eager endorsement, no immediate action was taken. While the 
latter issue would quickly be remedied, the former would continue to compli-
cate matters for some time to come.
IV
By early August 1912 the Admiralty was in possession of a full report con-
cerning the activities of the Royal Marine force sent to Flotta to establish 
temporary defences in the Orkneys.43 This report was detailed and wide 
ranging and had important implications, including, as Troubridge recognised, 
41In what might be described as a case of convergent development, the US Marine Corps conducted 
advance base exercises between December 1913 and January 1914. Cosmas and Shulimson, 
‘Formation of the U.S. Marine Corp’s Advance Base Force’.
42Battenberg, ‘Flying Corps of the Royal Marines’, 5 June 1912. TNA: ADM 116/1293.
43‘Report on the Expeditionary Force of the Royal Marines Sent to Establish Temporary Defences at Flotta 
for the protection of the Southern Entrances to Scapa Flow, July 1912ʹ. Ibid.
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for ‘the proposals put forward by the Second Sea Lord’.44 Nevertheless, 
despite acknowledging this, the Chief of Staff’s response was entirely focused 
on what it revealed about the potential defence arrangements for Scapa 
Flow. To this end, he proposed that a committee be set up to perfect these 
and he largely ignored the question of the ‘Flying Squadron’. Almost imme-
diately, therefore, the intermingling of the two questions had created 
a situation in which work on the new Special Service Force of the Royal 
Marines was receding into the background as attention focused predomi-
nantly on the security of the Orkney Islands. Fortunately, at this point 
Churchill intervened to keep consideration of the strike force on track. Work 
on ‘the emergency defence of Scapa Flow’, he wrote, should advance in 
accordance with Troubridge’s suggestion that a special committee be 
appointed to settle the details. At the same time, however, the First Lord 
also insisted that the ‘organisation of the flying column of marines as outlined 
by 2SL [Second Sea Lord] and COS [Chief of Staff] should not be delayed.’ 
A separate committee would work out the details.45
As a result of Churchill’s minute, on 10 October a committee was 
appointed to ‘draw up a scheme for the defence of Scapa Flow.’ For reasons 
that will be examined below, this committee was dissolved in February. 
Meanwhile, simultaneously and more importantly for this article, a parallel 
body was appointed to draw up a scheme for a flying column of the Royal 
Marines. Chaired by Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholls, the Deputy 
Adjutant General, it also included Commander C.R. Watson representing the 
Mobilisation Division of the Admiralty War Staff, Major H.E. Blumberg, the 
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of the Royal Marines, Captain H.F. 
Montgomery from the operations Division of the Admiralty War Staff, 
W. Sanger of the Accountant-General’s Department, and R. Skinner from the 
Naval Branch of the Admiralty Secretariat. In the main, its terms of reference 
coincided closely with Battenberg’s minute of 5 June. They were to:
consider and report upon the best manner of organising a flying column of 
Royal Marines, consisting of 3000 officers and men, with a view to its utilisation 
for seizing and holding an advanced base for the Fleet either in British, neutral 
or hostile territory . . .
However, they deviated in one important respect from the original. In 
a resumption of the adverse intertwining of the Orkney issue with the strike 
force question, the paragraph concluded that ‘the use of a portion in man-
ning the defences at Scapa Flow in an emergency [should be] kept in view.’46
Unsurprisingly, the committee members found this addendum confusing 
as regards the Admiralty’s intended priorities. Accordingly, they sought clarity 
44Minute by Troubridge, 2 August 1912. Ibid.
45Minute by Churchill, 27 September 1912. Ibid.
46‘Terms of Reference’ attached to Admiralty letter, 10 October 1912. Ibid.
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as to the primary focus of the new force. Was it to ‘man and defend temporary 
bases . . . in the United Kingdom’? Or was it to ‘seize temporary or advanced 
bases in foreign territory’? Was it to ‘cover the landing of a large force on 
a hostile coast’? Or, alternatively, could it be to ‘execute raids’?47 These were 
prescient questions. At this juncture, however, they were told to focus on the 
first two objectives, although, unhelpfully, they were also informed that in so 
doing they need not exclude consideration of the other two areas. Fortified 
with this clarification – really no clarification at all – the committee embarked 
upon its work.
The report took some five months to compile.48 Given the ambiguous 
advice with which it had been provided concerning the potential missions of 
the new force, the committee had faced the difficult task of attempting to 
reconcile a series of competing priorities that frequently pulled in different 
directions. As a result, its recommendations were framed by the need to cover 
a series of eventualities, some of which, it was assumed, might need to be 
delivered at the same time. This led to some common conclusions, but also to 
some that were applicable to specific scenarios only.
Topping the list of universal recommendations was a new regime of 
preparatory instruction. The various duties contemplated for the new force, 
the committee observed, ‘require a high standard of training and discipline 
on the part of the officers and men in order that they may be efficiently 
performed.’ This meant that those allocated to the flying squadron, be they 
active service personnel or members of the reserves, should as far as possible 
be trained together, and that this training should be undertaken intensively 
and to an expanded syllabus. The reason for this was that functions that 
would usually be performed by specialist corps, such as the Royal Engineers, 
would need for this force to be performed by its own members. To this end, 
instruction would be required in such new areas as the handling and repair of 
electrical instruments, the maintenance of telephones, and the construction 
and siting of batteries and magazines. Finally, given the need for heightened 
proficiency in such areas as embarking and disembarking, additional inten-
sive training was recommended even for tasks that fell within a Marine’s 
existing areas of competence.
However, while the committee felt able to make some recommendations 
that were common to the force as a whole, its report was clear that with the 
putative new unit having several distinct missions, much of what it proposed 
would be context specific. Accordingly, the committee felt obliged to con-
sider the organization and work of the so-called ‘flying column’ under two 
distinct headings depending on whether it was acting as:
47Minute by Nicholls, 29 October 1912. Ibid.
48‘Report of Committee appointed to draw up a scheme for the Organisation of a Flying Column, Royal 
Marines’, 7 March 1913. Ibid.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 15
(i) The garrison of the fixed defences at Scapa Flow and Cromarty.
(ii) The Special Service Force . . .
The reason for this was that the ‘conditions of (i) and (ii) differ materially’. The 
peace-time core of the garrisons at Cromarty and Scapa Flow, for example, 
would have to be stationed at these distant sites and not in the usual Marine 
barracks. As a result, they would not be available for common training – 
perhaps less of a problem as they would need to focus on special tasks 
peculiar to them, such as the use of heavy land service guns – and, further-
more, their numbers might need to be subtracted from the size of the force 
available for amphibious operations. There would also be particular compli-
cations in getting them quickly up to full strength in wartime.
As regards the strike force – they preferred the term ‘Special Service Force’ 
to ‘Flying Column’ – Nicholls and his fellow committee members were of the 
view that optimal efficiency would be created if it were organised into ‘self- 
contained units, to be called companies, each capable of manning a 4-gun 
battery, with 4 searchlights, and of providing for its own land defence and 
internal arrangements.’ It was, therefore, proposed that eleven such compa-
nies be formed, two from the Royal Marine Artillery and the remaining nine 
from the Royal Marine Light Infantry, with a peace-time nucleus of 496 active 
service men for these companies kept permanently at the several Marine 
headquarters. The main difficulty anticipated in achieving this was the pau-
city of active officers and NCOs available to make up this force and, for this 
reason, special measures were proposed to free up existing personnel from 
their current duties in order to make them available for their new roles. The 
committee also suggested ways to attract suitable people to join those 
reserves designated for wartime mobilisation into this force.
The report was a comprehensive assessment and there was no doubt that 
the committee had laboured long and hard to produce clear and definitive 
proposals despite the confusing operational parameters that had been given 
to it. Nevertheless, by the time the report came out, circumstances had 
changed significantly as far as east coast defence arrangements were con-
cerned, a fact that had already led to the disbanding of the Scapa Flow 
committee and the handing of its work to the Cromarty committee under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis Conway-Gordon.49 This had considerable implica-
tions for the development of the ‘flying column’. As the new Chief of Staff, 
Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, observed:
Since this Committee was formed, it has been practically decided that the 
defences of both Cromarty and Scapa Flow shall be fixed, and the decision as 
regards the latter place has to a certain extent modified the terms of reference 
49Murray to Conway-Gordon, 4 February 1913. Ibid.
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on which the committee have reported, and has led them to cover a wider field 
than would have been the case had this decision been come to earlier . . . 50
In practical terms, this meant that those parts of the report predicated on Marines 
rushing north to install and man temporary base defences were already out of 
date. Thus, as had previously been the case, the failure properly to delineate the 
role of the new force to one clear core mission, as had been suggested in 
Battenberg’s original minute, and the stubborn insistence on keeping open the 
subsidiary option of temporarily securing Scottish anchorages was continuing to 
hinder its development. As a result, the Admiralty’s first response to the report 
necessarily involved three months attempting to disaggregate those parts of the 
report that were now inapplicable from those that still had relevance to the 
originally intended mission. After some toing and froing of minutes between 
Alexander Duff of the War Staff Mobilisation Division, Henry Jackson, the Chief of 
Staff, and I. W. S. Anderson, the Principal Clerk in the Naval Branch of the Admiralty 
Secretariat, agreement was reached on the key questions. Foremost amongst 
them was ‘whether the defensive garrisons of Cromarty and Scapa Flow are to be 
taken from this organised force or not.’ In Jackson’s view: ‘It seems to me 
unnecessary.’51 However, as the representative from Naval Branch pointed out, 
given that the garrison of Cromarty had been fixed at a war-time strength of 346 
men and that it was expected that 600 or so would be needed for Scapa Flow, 
there was a new requirement for almost 1000 Marines for coastal defence 
purposes. From where these would be found was not entirely clear. The 
Director of the Operations Division of the war Staff, Captain Ballard, assumed 
that they would be ‘drawn from the personnel to be allotted to the Special Service 
Force.’52 However, if that were the case, the latter would need to be cut down 
from a proposed establishment of 3000 to one of just over 2000.53 Even then, as 
Duff had already observed, 496 Marines would be rendered unavailable for draft 
to the fleet. ‘It is necessary,’ he went on, to determine ‘ . . . whether or not they are 
to constitute an addition to peace requirements.’54 On all of these points the 
Deputy Adjutant General, General Nicholls, to whom these issues were referred, 
had definite views. He was certain, for example, that ‘the garrisons of Scapa Flow 
and Cromarty should be separate units, and quite distinct from the Special Service 
Force . . . ’ He was no less clear that it was ‘positively essential that the 496 Active 
Service men of the SSF . . . should not be available for draft in the ordinary sense 
whilst belonging to these forces.’ His reason: ‘it is necessary to have a highly 
trained force and one that is accustomed to have worked and been trained 
together under its officers and n[on-]c[ommissioned] officers.’ Such was the 
arduous nature of the proposed role that to ‘assemble hastily detachments 
50Minute by Jackson, 11 April 1913. Ibid.
51Ibid.
52Minute by Ballard, 5 May 1913. Ibid.
53Minute by Anderson, 6 May 1913. Ibid.
54Minute by Duff, 19 March 1913. Ibid.
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from the four Marine Divisions and to expect them to carry out the object 
required successfully against trained troops would be but to court disaster.’ For 
all of these reasons, he concluded that the necessary personnel should ‘be 
considered as an addition to peace requirements.’55
This interchange of minutes was referred to the Assistant Secretary, Sir 
Oswyn Murray. His response demonstrated why mixing up the otherwise 
unrelated areas of coast defence and amphibious warfare was so destructive. 
He concurred that the two questions were quite distinct and that they ‘should 
be kept as far as possible separate.’ However, as so much had changed since 
the original terms of reference were drafted and since the committee had met 
and reported that he thought it ‘advisable to refer the question back to the 
Committee for further consideration.’ In doing so, he suggested that this time 
‘a definite statement as to the duties the Special Service Force are required to 
perform in war would be desirable for the Committee’s guidance.’56 In short, 
he was arguing that the matter needed to be re-examined afresh. Despite the 
view of the new Second Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe, that ‘the Cromarty and 
Scapa Flow garrisons should be separated entirely from the Special Service 
Fore’ and that therefore the only issue was whether the latter should have an 
establishment of 2000 men, Battenberg, now First Sea Lord, supported 
Murray. ‘The whole of this will now have to be re-considered with the new 
scheme of taking over the East Coast Defences,’ he decided.57 However, in 
promoting delay, he differed from Murray in one crucial respect: he did not 
reconvene the committee. The matter was, thus, entirely held over, pending 
a final decision on the defence of the Scottish naval anchorages.
The inevitable effect of this decision was to push the amphibious warfare 
agenda firmly into the background as all eyes focused instead on the protec-
tion of the east coast. The most pressing aspect of the problem, it soon 
transpired, was the considerable expense likely to be entailed in making 
the various northern naval bases truly secure. In this context, the fact that 
the fortifications might be manned and operated more cheaply by Royal 
Marines than by the Royal Garrison Artillery – each Marine costing between 
£48 and £53 per annum as opposed to over £59 for a garrison artilleryman – 
meant that an immediate saving might be made by putting the defences 
north of Sheerness into the hands of the Admiralty and using Marines as the 
main personnel.58 Unsurprisingly, given this financial incentive, Churchill 
suggested just that. In a paper evidently intended for consideration by both 
the War Office and the Committee of Imperial Defence, he offered active 
service Marines for the peace time garrisons of the new coast defences – 800 
coming from their present numbers – and further proposed that this force 
55Minute by Nicholls, 13 May 1913. Ibid.
56Minute by Murray, 26 May 1913. Ibid.
57Minutes by Jellicoe, 27 May 1913 and Battenberg, 28 May 1913. Ibid.
58Memorandum by Churchill, no date [1913]. CAC: CHAR 13/22B/288-91.
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would be brought to full strength when war-time mobilisation commenced 
by means of Marine reservists. He also added, in a rider that would prove 
highly significantly for future developments, that ‘after providing for [those] 
requirements’, the Admiralty would be able to ‘organise 4 naval and marine 
brigades out of their surplus reservists’.59
Quite where the 800 active service Marines needed for the local defence 
batteries would come from was not spelt out at this stage. However, it soon 
became clear that, in the short term at least, it would be at the expense of the 
Special Service Force. This was made clear in a Memorandum by Churchill on the 
establishment levels of the Royal Marines. There were, he noted, a total of ‘17,800 
Marines, of whom 11,400 are afloat and 6,400 ashore’. ‘In war time,’ he continued, 
‘all active service Marines go afloat except 1,600 men, of whom 800 are unqua-
lified recruits. The other 800 have been lately saved for a special purpose’. This 
special purpose was, of course, ‘a mobile brigade of Marines which could if 
necessary be sent to protect the Orkneys or any other minor detached oversea 
service required by the Admiralty.’ If the memorandum up to this point seemed 
no more than a reiteration of the terms of reference that had been given to 
Nicholls’ committee – that is to say a flying column with two conflicting missions – 
what Churchill wrote next showed that the priorities had clarified in the wake of 
the east coast question and had done so decisively in one direction. ‘The 
Admiralty,’ Churchill proclaimed, ‘attach so much importance and urgency to 
the proper defence of the East Coast batteries that they would be prepared if 
necessary to defer the formation of this mobile brigade and employ these 800 
men in the first instance in manning the East Coast batteries.’60 In short, the Navy’s 
proposed organic amphibious capability would have to wait for the defence 
provisions of the new naval bases to be agreed and implemented.
It turned out to be a long wait. Despite the evident belief in mid-1913 that 
the defence arrangements of Cromarty and Scapa Flow would quickly be 
settled, allowing then for the subsequent resolution of the Special Service 
Force, this turned out not to be the case. Instead discussions over what to do 
over the fortification of the northern naval bases dragged on; they would still 
be on-going when war broke out in August 1914. As a result, when in early 
1914 Churchill asked for a progress report on the ‘flying column’, as he still 
called it, the Principal Clerk, Walter Nicholson confirmed that ‘arrangements 
have been suspended pending certain discussions [about East Coast 
Defences] at CID’ and the Admiralty Secretary was forced to admit that ‘no 
action has been taken since . . . May last.’61 If seemingly surprised, Churchill 
was, nevertheless, evidently still interested in seeing this taken forward. ‘Bring 
up as soon as the East Coast Defences Qu[estion] has been settled’ was his 
59Ibid. and Memorandum by Churchill, 2 May 1913. CAC: CHAR 13/22A/56-60.
60Memorandum by Churchill, no date [1913]. CAC: CHAR 13/22B/286-7.
61Minutes by Churchill, 10 April 1914, Nicholson, 23 April 1914, and Greene, 24 April 1914. TNA: ADM 
116/1293.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 19
response.62 The problem was that in the few remaining months of peace this 
would not be settled and, as a consequence, the Special Service Force of the 
Royal Marines would never get re-evaluated. As Churchill’s final minute 
shows, this was definitely not for lack of interest; rather it was 
a consequence of the unfortunate manner in which the topic had originally 
been framed. Pairing it with the separate base question had caused difficul-
ties from the very start; in May 1914 it was still hindering its swift 
development.
Nevertheless, the proposed forward deployment of Marines did bear fruit, 
if not in the manner originally envisaged. On the outbreak of war in 
August 1914, Churchill was eager to involve the Navy in the defence of the 
Belgian ports. Needing a land force to do this, he was naturally drawn to the 
Royal Marines, whose reconfiguration as a strike force had, as we have seen, 
been the subject of prolonged and on-going discussion. In his memorandum 
of 2 May 1913, Churchill had proposed that those Royal Marines not drafted 
to the fleet should be constituted into a separate brigade. Egged on by Fisher, 
who characteristically and enthusiastically endorsed the creation of such 
a force, Churchill now brought it into being, and the units thereby created 
were swiftly deployed first to Ostend and then, alongside even more hastily 
collected and equipped naval reservists, to Antwerp.63 Whether either of 
these operations was a good idea is open to serious question, but the lineal 
descent from a facet, if not the main element, of earlier thinking is clear.64
V
Nevertheless, while Battenberg’s idea of a Special Service Force of the Royal 
Marines was never actually brought into being – at least not until the Second 
World War – the proposal to create it, the enthusiastic reception it received, 
and the serious study of it undertaken by Nicholls’ committee and subse-
quently all point to the seriousness of the Admiralty’s desire to create its own 
organic amphibious strike force. In one sense, this is not surprising. As the first 
part of this article demonstrated the idea had a long pedigree at the 
Admiralty with key officers like Hankey, Crease and Phillimore all promoting 
the concept. That the Admiralty would rediscover this once the War Office 
had made it patently clear that it would not take part in combined operations 
was entirely natural. As a result, it is apparent that, contrary to what has been 
said, the Admiralty’s interest in amphibious operations did not end with 
62Minute by Churchill, 3 May 1914. Ibid.
63Fisher to Churchill, 16 August 1914. CAC: CHAR 13/43/25. This letter is dated 16 May 1914 in the 
catalogue, but it is clear from the content (e.g. seizing Ottoman dreadnoughts) that this cannot be 
correct.
64Historians to make this link include K. W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion. Britain’s Home Army, 1908–1919 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2005), 46 and 221; Barry Gough, Churchill and Fisher: titans at the 
Admiralty (Barnsley: Seaforth 2017), 254–5; Massam ‘British Maritime Strategy’, 248.
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either Fisher’s retirement in 1910 or Sir Arthur Wilson’s unconvincing perfor-
mance before the CID in August 1911; nor was Churchill’s creation of the 
Bayly committee to investigate the seizure of German islands a complete 
aberration, notwithstanding the hostile reception that Bayly’s proposals 
received. The matter was still being actively considered when war began in 
1914. Whether anything would ultimately have come of Battenberg’s minute 
in the sense that he wrote it is, of course, unknowable, but that is was being 
seriously considered and genuinely pushed forward is a significant fact.
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